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Abstract 
Global climate change and security of supply concerns pose significant 
challenges for sustainable development as well as the need to improve 
energy efficiency in transition and developing economies. Meanwhile, 
economic theory suggests that market-based economic policies and 
reforms are crucial for accelerating energy efficiency in developing and 
transition countries. Hence, this paper analyses the impacts of several 
market-oriented economic reforms on energy efficiency in the transition 
countries. The transition countries experienced a rapid marketization 
process that saw their economies transformed from central planning 
towards more market based economies since the early 1990s. The 
econometric results from the bias corrected fixed-effect analysis 
(LSDVC) suggest that both large and small scale privatisation process 
has been the sole driver of energy efficiency in transition countries. 
However, the lack of suitable institutions to support overall-market 
reforms implies that other market based economic reforms remain 
ineffective in improving energy efficiency in transition countries.  
 
Keywords: market reforms, energy efficiency, transition countries, institutions 
JEL Classification: P28; Q54; C33 
 
 
 
 
* Corresponding author. Heriot-Watt University, Department of Economics, Mary Burton 
Building, EH14 4AS, Edinburgh, United Kingdom, Phone: +44 (0)131 4583844, Email: 
rn71@hw.ac.uk. 
 
2 
 
1. Introduction 
Since the early 1990s, the ‘Washington Consensus’1 became a standard package towards 
economic reforms for many crisis-ridden developing countries (Williamson, 1993). 
Many transition and developing economies adopted a market oriented approach to 
economic reforms since then. The overall structural changes in the economy implied 
that the energy sector also experienced marketization across the developing world. 
Many advanced economies (such as the OECD) and over 70 developing countries had 
introduced some market-oriented reform steps in the electricity sector by the end of 
1990s (Bacon, 1999; Steiner, 2001; Jamasb et. al., 2005). While these counties are still 
pursuing reforms at different stages; the empirical evidence on the impacts of overall 
market driven economic reforms in the economy and energy efficiency2 remains to be 
examined considering the twin concerns of growing global climate change and security 
of supply towards economic development. 
In theory, market oriented reforms should promote substantial energy efficiency due to 
the adoption of more commercial policies and increased openness to private investment 
as generally believed by scholars (Anderson, 1995). Improvement in energy efficiency 
coincides with the overall economic aims of increasing productivity and 
competitiveness of the economy. The reliance on market, both, as a resource allocating 
agency and incentive mechanism can optimize energy allocation and incentivise 
consumers to reduce waste or choose the most cost-reflective energy saving equipment 
and appliances (Fan, et. al, 2007). While energy serves as a factor input, effective market 
signals in the form of cost-reflective energy prices implies that produces decrease 
energy consumption by switching to other substitutes when energy prices rise. It can 
also induce energy saving technologies and innovations (Jorgenson and Wilcoxen, 1993; 
Popp, 2002). In addition, best energy policies are often those aimed at making markets 
work better by eliminating market imperfections, mitigating market power through 
competition policies, and internalizing environmental externatilities (such as climate 
change impacts) using flexible market-based mechanisms (Joskow, 2001).  Hence, it can 
be argued that energy efficiency improvement is strongly linked with policies aimed at 
strengthening the effectiveness of market forces in the economy (Meyers, 1998).  
However, the success of market-oriented economic reforms can tremendously depend 
on the development of market-based institutional framework to support reforms 
(Hogan, 2001). The existence of proper institutional environment (so called rules of the 
game which can be explicit, formal or implicit, informal) and institutional arrangements, 
(so called governance structures are crucial for the reinforcement of market-based 
reforms to produce its desired consequences (North, 1971; Williamson, 1996).  Thus, 
                                                           
1
 The term ‘Washington Consensus’ was coined by John Williamson in 1989. 
2 The definition of energy efficiency varies. At the aggregated (macro) level, it is defined as a ratio of 
energy consumption to GDP while energy efficiency is defined as mean energy services provided per unit 
of energy input at a disaggregated product level (see Jaffe et.al. 2004). This paper uses the macro 
approach towards understanding energy efficiency. 
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similar approaches to economic reforms can lead to different outcomes depending upon 
the existing levels of formal and informal institutions in each country (Hirschhausen 
and Waelde, 2001). 
 
Nonetheless, the quantitative evidence on the linkage between markets-oriented 
economic reforms and energy efficiency remains relatively unexplored in the economics 
literature. This paper, thus, aims to contribute towards the relatively scarce literature 
studying the impacts of various market-oriented economic reforms on energy efficiency. 
We consider the popularly termed ‘transition economies’ (TECs hereafter) comprising 
twenty-nine countries3 of Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union 
(FSU) for this purpose. These countries, being highly energy intensive prior reforms, 
initiated economic transformation from central planning towards marketization since 
the early 1990s. Hence, this paper analyses the impacts of different market oriented 
economic reforms on energy efficiency in two decades of market driven reforms in the 
transition countries using panel data econometrics. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the transition 
countries including the evolution of energy efficiency over-time. Section 3 discusses the 
relevant theoretical and empirical literatures used in this study. Section 4 includes the 
data and econometric methodology while section 5 discusses the results. Finally, 
Section 6 concludes.     
 
2. The Transition Countries: An Overview 
The systemic change of early 1990s marked the end of central planning and paved the 
way for economy wide market-oriented reforms in the TECs as a part of pervasive 
political and economic transformation. The market oriented reforms included aspects 
such as the expansion of competitive markets in all sectors of the economy, more wide 
spread private ownership, adoption of appropriate institutions, laws and policies to 
facilitate market functioning and efficiency, setting standards for good corporate 
governance and business conduct (EBRD, 2000).  The pace and order of these reforms 
varied across the TECs primarily reflecting the constraints on any government’s ability 
and resources. Some countries such as Lithuania, Russia and Slovak Republic opted for 
instant large scale privatisation without appropriate legal framework as a ‘shock 
therapy’ which often resulted in significant economic and social costs.  In contrast, 
Belarus and the Caspian countries (e.g. Turkmenistan) have exhibited great reluctance 
towards economic reforms and have not started with the initial reform process of 
liberalization, small scale privatization and the creation of an environment supportive 
of private investment. However, the transformation of the power sector was one of the 
                                                           
3
 The countries can be divided into three distinct groups Central Eastern Europe and Baltic States (CEB), 
South Eastern Europe (SEE), and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) based on European Bank of 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) areas of operation. See Table A in the Appendix. 
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prominent components of this economic transformation because of the economic 
characteristics of the sector which involved large sunk investments operated by 
regulated monopolies with alleged significant links with national income and output 
(Nepal and Jamasb, 2011). 
 
A fundamental characteristic common across all TECs was that these countries were 
highly energy intensive (i.e. high energy inefficiency). The legacy of central planning in 
the absence of any effective market signals, excessive reliance on energy intensive 
industries and the inefficiency of energy use spurred by lower power prices contributed 
to high energy intensity in the region. Furthermore, the distorted energy prices and soft 
budget constraints for industry (e.g., being debt free) also led to high energy use in the 
TECs4. Historically, the energy consumed per unit of GDP in the transition economies 
was estimated at four to eight times that of OECD countries and the United States (Gray, 
1995).  
 
However, the energy intensities of the TECs have declined since the start of the 
transition process although the extent of this decline varies greatly across countries 
(Cornilie and Frankhauser, 2004). The CIS countries being the most energy intensive 
have reduced their energy intensity by about one-third since 1994 (EBRD, 2008). 
Likewise, these countries still use three times more energy as compared to Western 
Europe to produce a unit of GDP in terms of purchasing power parities (PPP). Hence, 
there is a significant potential in the TECS to be more energy efficient and eventually 
converge at a similar levels with the OECD countries in terms of per capita electricity 
consumption. 
 
The evolution of energy intensity is also of greater importance from a policymaking 
perspective because: a) it allows us to know how energy demand responses to changes 
in economic system and structure; b) it contributes to the active policy debate within 
the transition counties on the link between total energy use growth and GDP growth 
and c) it allows the policymakers to identify the measures to reduce the energy-
efficiency gap. The energy-efficiency gap exists due to differences in the actual and 
optimal energy use (Jaffe and Stavins, 1994). Figure one below shows CIS countries such 
as Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have high energy intensity of GDP indicating the 
greatest potentials for energy-efficiency gap reductions while countries like Latvia, 
Lithuania, and Hungary have similar levels of energy intensities as compared to EU-15, 
OECD and the US in 2008. 
 
Thus, it is clear that overall market-oriented economic reforms have resulted in 
declining average energy intensities across the transition region as national energy 
intensities have declined after the transformation process. However, the nature and 
                                                           
4
 Please see Schaffer (1998) for details concerning soft-budget constraints among firms in transition 
economies. 
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magnitude of impacts resulting from different market driven economic reforms on 
energy efficiency is not clear. This paper exactly aims to cover this gap by identifying 
the drivers of energy efficiency improvement in the transition countries during the last 
twenty years’ of overall market oriented-economic reform process. 
 
 
Figure 1: Energy intensity versus carbon intensity of GDP in 2010 in TECs 
Source: Adapted from EBRD (2008) 
 
3. Review of the Literature 
A number of studies have studied the impacts of market-oriented economic reforms on 
energy efficiency in the international context.  Seabright et. al (1996), in general, argued 
that the promotion of open and competitive markets, removal of subsidies on energy 
prices and market based-energy conservation programs in many countries contributed 
to improvements in energy efficiency. China, being one of the rapidly growing 
economies, has gathered considerable attention among researchers on this subject. A 
study by Sinton and Fridley (2000) concluded that energy efficiency improved in China 
since 1996 as a result of the shift from state-owned to collective, private and foreign 
invested ownership.  Fisher-Vanden (2003) also argued that the implementation of 
market reforms can facilitate the shift towards less energy intensive production in the 
Chinese context using a dynamic computable general equilibrium analysis (CGE). 
Similarly, Fan et. al. (2007) concluded that accelerated marketization contributed 
substantially to energy efficiency improvements in China by estimating the change in 
energy own-price elasticity, as well as the elasticity of substitutions between energy and 
non-energy (capital and labour) in China during the periods 1979-1992 and 1993-2003.  
In the regional context, two studies are of notable importance. Cornilie and Frankhauser 
(2004) study the evolution of energy intensities in the transition countries by 
decomposing the energy data and using panel data model based on random effects to 
identify the main factors driving improvements in energy intensity. The study concludes 
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that energy prices and progress in enterprise restructuring are the two most significant 
drivers for efficient energy use.  Similarly, another study by Markandya et al. (2006) 
investigates the relationship between twelve countries of Eastern Europe and the 
European Union (EU) members to examine any evidence of convergence in energy 
intensities across them. A two way fixed effects model is used to study the convergence 
in income and energy intensity between the advanced (EU 15) and the transition 
countries. While some evidence of convergence in energy intensity exists among the EU 
members and the transition countries; the findings suggest that the rate of convergence 
in energy intensities varies across countries.  Hence, both studies, to some extent, 
confirm to the notion that the transition towards a more market driven economic 
reforms contributed to a fall in energy intensities among the transition countries. 
However, the empirical results obtained from these studies are debatable because it is 
well established in econometric literature that an individual-specific fixed effect model 
engenders biased estimates in the absence of a large and comprehensive dataset. This is 
because a static fixed effect model is typically designed for dataset with large ‘N’ and 
small ‘T’ (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). Thus, there is a need to correct for such biasness 
in the estimates when the sample size is small. It is also highly likely that individual 
country specific characteristics that are unobservable and non-measurable such as 
culture, legal origin, geographical location, history etc. and are fixed over time are likely 
to  be correlated with the various economic reforms and thereby contradicting the use 
of random effects. Likewise, the limited number of cross-sections ‘N’ used in the above 
studies implies that the data represents a finite sample and not actually a random 
sample. Moreover, the use of a static model in itself is not valid as the effects of 
economic reforms on outcomes are not instantaneous but rather lagged.  Hence, this 
paper uses a bias-corrected fixed effect (LSDVC) analysis to study the impacts of various 
market reforms on energy efficiency since 1990 till 2010 in the transition countries.   
 
4. Data and Econometric Methodology   
The paper investigates the drivers of energy efficiency considering various market-
driven economic reforms in the transition countries since the start of the transition 
process (i.e. 1990 till 2010). Hence, this paper uses the ‘Transition Indicators’ developed 
by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) that measures the 
progress in transition through a set of indicators. The reform assessments are made in 
nine areas encompassing 1) small scale privatization, 2) large scale privatization, 3) 
governance and enterprise restructuring, 4) price liberalisation, 5) trade and foreign 
exchange system, 6) competition policy, 7) banking reform and interest rate 
liberalisation, 8) securities markets and non-bank financial institutions and 9) 
infrastructure includes electric power, railways, telecommunication, roads, water and 
waste water. The measurement scale for these indicators ranges from 1 to 4+, where 1 
represents little or no change from a rigid centrally planned economy while 4+ 
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represents the standards of an industrialized market economy. For example, a score of 
4+ in the power sector reforms would imply that electricity tariffs are fully cost-
reflective and provide adequate incentives for efficiency improvements, the presence of 
large-scale private sector involvement in the unbundled and well-regulated sector and 
fully liberalised sector with well-functioning arrangements for network access and full 
competition in generation (EBRD, 2001; EBRD, 2008). 
 
The paper constructs the following economic reform indicators from the set of nine 
indicators to summarize the different types of market driven economic reforms in the 
transition countries: 
 
• Privatisation Reform Index (PRI): composite index based on un-weighted average of 
small scale privatisation and large scale privatisation reforms. 
• Governance Reform Index (GRI)5:  composite index based on un-weighted average of 
competition policy and corporate governance and enterprise restructuring reforms. 
• Overall Market Liberalization Index (OMLI): composite index based on un-weighted 
average of reforms in price liberalization and trade and foreign exchange reforms. 
• Other Infrastructure Reform Index (OINFRI): composite index based on un-weighted 
average of reform scores in roads, water and waste water and telecommunication. 
• Financial Reform Index (FRI): composite index based on un-weighted average of 
banking reform and interest rate liberalization and securities markets and non-bank 
financial institutions. 
• Electric Power Index (EPI): electric power reform index alone. 
 
The reform progress in railways is excluded due to many missing observations while 
the reform progress in the power sector is considered as a separate reform variables 
from other infrastructural reforms. This is because the importance of the sector meant 
that the reforms in power sector were critical in determining the pace and direction of 
overall economic reforms in the transition countries. Similarly, the paper uses the 
energy intensity (a ratio of total energy consumption and GDP) as a measure of energy 
efficiency (EI) across the transition countries.  The data on energy intensities were 
obtained from the World Development Indicators (WDI) and EBRD. Furthermore, the 
energy intensities estimates are adjusted for purchasing power parities (PPP) which as 
a currency conversion technique eliminates the price level differences levels across 
countries. The logarithmic transformed energy efficiency estimate is denoted by LEI. 
Table B in Appendix includes the variables included in this study. 
 
The period of analysis ranges from 1990-2010 (i.e. 20 years) covering 27 countries. 
Some of the transition countries have already obtained a membership at the EU while 
some are in the process of being an EU member and have the potential for joining EU. 
Table A in Appendix shows the status of the countries included in the sample in terms of 
                                                           
5
 The governance reform index can be used as a proxy of institutional reform index in this study. 
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EU accession and that 15 out of 27 countries included in our sample are associated with 
the EU as shown by Table 2. Turkey and Montenegro6 are excluded from the sample of 
countries studied due to data unavailability on the predictor and criterion variables 
respectively. 
 
The dataset thus comprises an unbalanced panel comprising 27 cross-sections (N) with 
short time series (T) of 20 years observed from period 1990-20010. Each cross-section 
represent a diverse set of countries with its own economic, political, cultural, etc. 
system and history allowing every possibility for individual country-specific 
characteristics to influence the behaviour of other. However, panel data econometric 
methods consisting fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE) estimators can account 
for unobserved heterogeneity as established in econometric literature. The FE and RE 
estimators differ in their assumptions about the unobserved heterogeneity. The RE 
estimator assumes that the composite error term (i.e. also containing the individual 
specific effect) is uncorrelated with the explanatory variable and requires to be treated 
as if they were a part of the error term. Conversely, FE estimator uses a dummy for 
every individual country7 and thus taking the unobserved heterogeneity into account. 
Hence, the FE estimator is a special case of the RE estimator. The RE estimator where 
applicable (i.e. provided the assumptions8 on the error term are met) is more efficient 
as it has the lowest variance amongst unbiased estimators. Likewise, the FE estimator is 
always consistent implying that the estimator converges in probability to the true value 
of the parameter. The use of a Hausman Test can make an appropriate choice upon 
applying RE and FE. This paper, however, uses the FE estimator as unobserved 
heterogeneity such as culture, legal origin, geographical location, history etc. that are 
fixed over time are likely to  be correlated with several economic reforms. This is 
because the countries included in our sample are not identical to each other. It implies 
that the fundamental assumption of RE model is violated and not useful in this context. 
Further, the data used in this study does not represent a random sample as ‘N’ is limited 
but represents a finite sample allowing the use of FE estimator9. 
 
However, the relationship between overall economic reforms and energy efficiency is 
likely to be a complex one as the implementation of economic reforms does not 
instantaneously lead to improved energy efficiency. The behaviour of the dependent 
variable(s) can depend upon the past values of itself along with a set of independent and 
                                                           
6
 Montenegro became an independent state from 3 June 2006.  
7 An alternative way to understand FE estimation would be to assign country specific dummy while 
performing a pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. On the other hand, a FE estimator takes 
into account the temporal (i.e. within) variation of the relevant variables and hence produces appropriate 
results when applied to variables that vary considerably over time. The FE estimator is also known as the 
Least Squares Dummy Variables (LSDV). 
8
 The RE estimator is applicable on the assumption that the individual unobserved heterogeneity must be 
uncorrelated with the regressors (explanatory variables). 
9 A static FE model can be specified as yit = β0 + Xitβ + αi + ϵit  which can be estimated using commands 
‘xtreg’ or ‘xtregar’ for AR (1) estimates in STATA.  
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control variables (Bruno, 2005). Thus a dynamic specification of the panel model can be 
expressed as yit = β0 + ρyit-1 + Xitβ + αi + ϵit where ‘ρ’is the coefficient of the lagged value 
of the dependent variable while ‘Xitβ’ represents the matrix of explanatory variables and 
coefficients.  
 
However, it is well established in econometric literature that a dynamic LSDV model 
with a lagged dependent variable generates biased estimates when ‘T’ is small as in our 
case (see for e.g. Roodman, 2006). The estimates obtained from a dynamic LSDV 
become meaningless unless corrected for bias in small samples. Kiviet (1995) devised a 
bias-corrected LSDV estimator applicable only for balanced panels which is understood 
to have the lowest Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) for panels of all sizes (Bun and 
Kiviet, 2003). Based on these previous works, a version of bias-corrected LSDV estimate 
(LSDVC) has been developed by Bruno (2005) which can be applied under two 
fundamental assumptions: a) it has a strictly exogenous selection rule and b) the error 
term ‘ϵit’ is classified as ‘an unobserved white noise disturbance’. The approximation 
terms are of no direct use for estimation as they are all evaluated at the unobserved true 
parameter values. Hence, the true parameter values are replaced by estimates from 
some consistent estimator to make them work (Bruno, 2005). The preferred estimator 
is then plugged into the bias approximations formulae while the resulting bias 
approximation estimates βi_hat are subtracted to derive the corrected LSDV estimator as 
LSDVCi=LSDV- βi_hat where i=1 in STATA by default that indicates the accuracy of the 
bias approximation10. The consistent estimator to be chosen to initialize the bias 
corrections could vary, for example, between the Arellano-Bond (AB) and Blundell-
Bond (BB) estimators. The AB estimator is a GMM estimator for the first differenced 
model relying on a greater number of internal instruments (Arellano and Bond, 1991). 
The BB estimator assumes that the first differences of the instrumental variables are 
uncorrelated with fixed effects and augments the AB estimator by allowing for 
introducing more instruments and improve efficiency of the estimates (Blundell and 
Bond, 1998).  
 
An alternative to dynamic LSDV panel estimates would be to use other consistent 
Instrumental Variable (IV) and Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) estimators as 
proposed in econometrics (Roodman, 2006). However, the relative performance 
evaluation of LSDVC in comparison to LSDV, AB and BB estimators by Bruno (2005) for 
unbalanced panels with small ‘N’ concludes that the STATA computed LSDVC version 
outperforms all other estimators in terms of root mean square errors (RMSE) and bias. 
We thus use the LSDVC model as shown in equation one to examine the impact of 
several market driven economic reforms and energy efficiency in transition countries 
and accordingly report the results for all the estimators used to initialize the bias 
corrections (AB and BB).  
                                                           
10
 Using ‘xtlsdvc’command in STATA, the estimator first produces uncorrected LSDV estimates which then 
approximates the sample bias of the estimator using Kiviet’s higher order asymptotic expansion 
techniques (Bruno, 2005). The estimation also includes one lag by default. 
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LEIit = β0 + ρLEIit-1 + β1PRIit + β2OINFRIit + β3GRIit + β4FRIit + β5OMLIit + β6EPIit + αi + ϵit             (1) 
 
 
The use of EBRD indexes based on individual components score as regressors largely 
confirms to the exogenous selection rule as a requirement for performing LSDVC. The 
standard test statistics along with the Arellano-Bond test for first and second order 
autocorrelation is reported in Appendix (see Table G). Under the null of no 
autocorrelation, the presence of second order autocorrelation would imply that the 
estimates are inconsistent. In addition, the estimates of the Sargan test of 
overidentifying restrictions reported by the Blundell Bond estimator should test 
significantly different from zero to reject the null that overidentifying restrictions are 
valid11.  
 
Table 1 below reports the descriptive statistics and behaviour of the dependent and 
independent variables used in the study. In general, the transition countries are still a 
distant apart from fully meeting the economic reform standards of an industrialised 
economy in all sectors. Thus, market-based economic transformation is an ongoing 
process in the transition countries.  It can be inferred that liberalizing the economy as a 
whole (i.e. opening up trade, liberalising foreign exchange and price liberalization in the 
economy) has been on high agenda of reforms across all transition countries though the 
extent of progress considerably varies across them. The incentives to join the EU and 
the underling motives to benefit from regional integration have resulted in increased 
economic openness in the region. However, overall price liberalization in the economy 
has not been necessarily applied to the power sector as all groups of countries 
considered are still a distance away from achieving cost-reflective pricing of electricity 
as suggested by the mean reform score12. Likewise, the governance reforms (including 
competition policy and corporate governance and enterprise restructuring reforms) 
which are also a proxy measure for institutional reforms seems to have progressed the 
least but at similar levels across the transition countries considered in this study.  The 
low governance scores, to some extent, also explain the widespread corruption that 
these countries faced during the yesteryears (EBRD, 2001). Privatisation reforms (both 
large scale and small scale), which is often perceived as a cornerstone of this economic 
transformation process, has advanced ahead as compared to reforms in the financial 
sector and reform in the electric power sector on average.  Meanwhile, Table C in 
Appendix shows the correlation coefficients among the dependent variables used in this 
study. 
 
 
                                                           
11
 As an example, Sen and Jamasb (2010) use the LSDVC estimator in an econometric analysis of the 
determinants and impacts of electricity reform in India. 
12
 A score of 4 and above would imply that the existence of cost-reflective electricity tariffs.   
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Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum No. of 
Observations 
LEI 5.76 0.61 4.51 7.45 563 
PRI 2.93 0.98 1 4.17 567 
OINFRI 2.02 0.80 1 3.89 567 
GRI 2.00 0.70 1 3.67 567 
OMLI 3.47 1.02 1 4.33 567 
FRI 2.13 0.82 1 4 567 
EPI 2.25 0.94 1 4 567 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the variables (up to two decimal places) 
 
5. Results and Discussions 
The aim of this paper is to examine the impacts of several market-oriented economic 
reforms on energy efficiency in the transition countries during the last twenty years’ of 
marketization. By doing so, the paper empirically analyses whether market-driven 
economic reforms matter in addressing energy efficiency. The regression method 
involves a bias corrected fixed effect analysis initialised by AH and BB estimators while 
the standard errors are bootstrapped13 and obtained from 100 repetitions which largely 
depended on the number of observations. Bootstrapping allows us to generate an 
estimate of the sampling distribution of almost any statistic using very simple methods 
(Varian, 2005).  Hence, the bootstrapped standard errors (SE) are reported. The AB 
tests of autocorrelation and BB test of over identifying restrictions was also performed 
for the econometric estimations14. Table 2 below reports the results obtained from the 
regression analysis based on equation one. 
The results show that the lagged term of energy efficiency is highly significant. This 
indicates that last year’s energy efficiency had an effect on previous years’ energy 
efficiency across the transition countries. However, progress in governance reforms 
(which is a proxy for institutional reforms) has no significant effect on energy efficiency. 
This might be because the reforms have been too slow (see table one) while the reforms 
have advanced more in theory than in practice.  The finding is consistent with the views 
that that the enforcement mechanisms of economic reforms were weak as the state’s 
                                                           
13
 Bootstrap is a computer-based method for assigning measures of accuracy to sample estimates (Efron 
and Tibshirani, 1994). 
14
 The results can be provided upon request. Likewise, we also performed an OLS and FE (i.e. LSDV) 
estimations and compare the results to determine the nature of bias for each hypothesis. In all cases, we 
observed bias as OLS and FE does not take endogeneity into account. 
12 
 
legal and judicial capacities were limited during the transition process as argued by 
Stiglitz (1999). The policymakers initially failed to understand that reforms in different 
sectors of the economy in the transition countries is closely interlinked with broader 
legal and institutional contexts throughout the economy. This eventually led to a decade 
long of neglecting institutional differences across countries in implementing power 
sector reforms (Hirschhausen and Waelde, 2006). In turn, the lack of appropriate 
institutional framework to support market-based reforms also explains the 
insignificance of reforms in the power sector (which includes tariff adjustments, 
unbundling and the introduction of more commercialism); overall market liberalisation 
reforms (a highly pursued reform area in transition countries); reforms in other 
infrastructures and financial sector reforms on energy efficiency in transition countries.  
 
LSDVC Dynamic Regression 
(Bootstrapped SE) 
 
Arellano-Bond 
(AB) 
Blundell-Bond 
(BB) 
LEI. L1 0.925*** 
(0.025) 
1.052*** 
(0.014) 
GRI 0.011 
(0.023) 
0.008 
(0.023) 
OMLI -0.006 
(0.009) 
-0.001 
(0.009) 
OINFRI -0.010 
(0.017) 
-0.001 
(0.018) 
EPI -0.005 
(0.012) 
0.003 
(0.012) 
FRI 0.010 
(0.020) 
0.016 
(0.020) 
PRI -0.036*** 
(0.012) 
-0.028*** 
(0.012) 
Table 2: Impacts of economic reforms on energy efficiency 
*, **, *** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
Numbers in ( ) reports the SE 
 
The transition countries are still a distant away from achieving cost-reflective electricity 
pricing as suggested by table 1. For example, the electricity tariffs across CIS countries 
are well below the cost recovery levels and are only gradually adjusted removing any 
incentives for households and industries (in particular) to use the energy efficiently. 
The industries in these countries continue to benefit from soft budget constraints either 
through state subsidies or tolerance of tax and utility arrears coupled with non-
payment of energy bills in non-industrial sectors (Cornillie and Frankhauser, 2004). 
Thus, reforms in the power sector might not have produced any significant impact on 
energy efficiency. On the other hand, although market oriented power sector reforms 
advanced in theory in many transition countries; the implementation in practice 
remained too weak to influence any outcomes relating to energy efficiency significantly 
(Nepal and Jamasb, 2011).  
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The legacy of central planning may have translated into slow willingness and 
commitment towards implementing market-based economic reforms leading to 
insignificant impacts on energy efficiency. This is because the collapse of central 
planning was not a choice of any country or government but rather a consequence of 
dysfunctional political and economic system of early years. The first post-communist 
governments in some SEE (Belarus) and many CIS countries (Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan) were led by the same political elites under communism delaying the 
progress in transition. Likewise, in countries like Bosnia and Herzegovina, FR 
Yugoslavia and Tajikistan; overall economic reforms has been slow as these countries 
had to do some ‘catching up’ due to civil war and ethnic-conflicts. Regional integration 
via EU membership also catapulted economic reforms in countries like Latvia, Slovakia 
and Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, etc. However, the lack of proper institutions in these 
countries meant that international integration was not always in line to complement 
domestic economic reforms. As such, the inability to effectively understand the 
functioning of a market economy coupled with the misunderstandings of the market-
reform process itself explains the insignificance of various market-based reforms on 
energy efficiency in transitions countries. 
However, the transfer of ownership to the private sector (both small scale and large 
scale) has a significant effect on energy efficiency. This result is in line with the 
theoretical motives of privatisation involving improvements in economic efficiency and 
efficient resource allocation (see Vickers and Yarrow, 1988). The state-owned firms 
were operationally and technically inefficient before the start of the transition process. 
Privatisation could have spurred efficient energy use and the adoption of energy 
efficient technologies in the process of minimizing waste and maximising profit. 
Furthermore, the increase in profit can also trigger a wider adoption of energy saving 
technologies. The profit maximisation objectives under privatisation might have also 
increased the energy prices (even though electricity still remains to be highly 
subsidised) prompting efficient energy use among the price sensitive consumers.  In 
addition, it also underscores the importance of hard-budget constraints including the 
adjustment of tariffs to appropriate levels as well as the need to reduce the excessive 
price support through government subsidies in improving energy efficiency in the 
transition countries. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper analysed whether market-driven economic reforms matter or not in driving 
energy efficiency by analysing the impacts of various market-based economic reforms 
on energy efficiency across the transition countries. Improving energy efficiency is 
crucial in mitigating the adverse economic, social and environmental impacts of climate 
change. Energy efficiency also promotes energy conservation and thereby strengthening 
the security of energy supply. Moreover, climate change and security of supply issues 
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pose significant threats for sustainable development as well as highlight its needs 
across the developing regions and economies in systemic transition.  
The results from the bias-corrected fixed effect analysis (LSDVC) suggest that 
privatisation has been the lone driver of energy efficiency in the transition countries. 
Other market-based reforms failed to produce any significant impacts due to the lack of 
appropriate institutional support to complement those reforms as suggested by the 
results. As such, creating proper intuitions to buttress the market-based reforms is 
necessary in transition and developing countries. However, the results can vary among 
different country groups (SEE, CEB and CIS) which is not analysed in this paper due to 
small sample size.  Likewise, the EU members included in our sample can have greater 
institutional endowment than non EU members which can produce different results. 
Moreover, the potentials to reduce the energy efficiency-gap exist among all transition 
countries.  
This can be achieved by more market based mechanisms and privatisation in the 
presence of appropriate institutional arrangements. However, it is necessary for the 
policymakers to understand that the markets as well as the institutions to support them 
are not perfect. Thus, the resulting market imperfections can lead to market failures 
which require appropriate government interventions to offset the effect of market 
failures. In addition, two major messages are clear from the results for market-based 
economic reforms to produce significant impacts on energy efficiency in the transition 
countries: a) the need to harmonize reforms in ‘theory’ or paper with reforms in 
‘practice’ and b) the need to support overall economic reforms with other related 
institutional reforms in the economy. Likewise, it is also necessary to ensure adequate 
government support to address both the demand-side and supply- side constraints of 
promoting energy efficiency is desirable in the light of overall market oriented 
economic reforms.  
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Appendix:  
Table A: Countries included in the study 
Source: EBRD (2001) 
Central Eastern 
Europe and Baltic 
States (CEB) 
South Eastern 
Europe (SEE) 
Commonwealth of 
Independent States 
(CIS) 
Others 
Croatia**, Estonia*, 
Hungary*, Latvia*, 
Lithuania, Poland*, 
Slovak Republic* 
and Slovenia* 
Albania***, Bosnia 
and 
Herzegovina***, 
Bulgaria*, FYR 
Macedonia** , 
Serbia, Romania* 
and Montenegro*** 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Georgia, 
Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, 
Russia, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine 
and Uzbekistan 
Turkey** and 
Mongolia 
*EU members, ** EU candidates and *** Potential EU candidates 
 
Table B: List and description of variables 
Source: Own compilation 
 
Type Variables Description Units Source 
Dependent 
Variables 
LEI Energy Intensity 
(log transformed) 
Energy Use per 
$1000 GDP (PPP 
adjusted) 
WDI and 
EBRD 
 
 
 
 
Independent 
Variables 
EPI Electric Power 
Reform Index 
Scaled from 1 to 
4+ 
EBRD 
PRI Privatisation Reform 
Index 
Scaled from 1 to 
4+ 
EBRD 
OINFRI Other infrastructure 
Reform Index 
Scaled from 1 to 
4+ 
EBRD 
FRI Financial Reform 
Index 
Scaled from 1 to 
4+ 
EBRD 
GRI Governance Reform Scaled from 1 to EBRD 
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Index 4+ 
OMLI Overall Market 
Liberalization Index 
Scaled from 1 to 
4+ 
EBRD 
 
Table F: Correlation matrix for the independent variables 
 
 PRI OINFRI GRI OMLI FRI EPI 
PRI 1.00 
OIRI 0.43 1.00  
EGRI 0.38 0.54 1.00  
OMLI 0.47 0.58 0.46 1.00  
FRI 0.48 0.66 0.59 0.34 1.00  
EPI 0.29 0.24 0.32 0.20 0.35 1.00 
 
Table G: Tests of Overidentifying Restrictions 
Estimator Test H0  
AB 1st order autocorrelation No autocorrelation Z=-7.16 
Prob>z=0.000 
 2nd order autocorrelation No autocorrelation Z=-2.76 
Prob>z=0.316 
 Sargan Test of Overid. 
Restriction 
 Prob>Chi2=0.005 
BB AB test for AR(1) in first 
differences 
No autocorrelation Z=-4.56 
Prob>z=0.000 
 AB test for AR(2) in first 
differences 
No autocorrelation Z=-0.77 
Prob>z=0.443 
 Sargan Test of Overid. 
restrictions 
 Prob>chi2=0.324 
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